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I. Introduction 
 
This year of uncertainty and waiting. The Supreme Court agreed to hear a case challenging 
whether agency fee was constitutional in the public sector. (Friederichs) The Court held oral 
argument on Monday, January 11, 2016, and it appeared poised to find agency fees 
unconstitutional.  In a turn of historical significance, the death of Supreme Court Justice Antonin 
Scalia may have significant repercussions for Friedrichs. While no one knows for sure what will 
happen, Scalia's death strengthens the likelihood that the forty years of precedent finding agency 
fees constitutional will not be overturned in this case.  In the Fisher case, the Supreme Court 
surprised observers by taking up the question of affirmative action for the second time.  
We are beginning to see the impact of the Board’s seminal decision in Pacific Lutheran 
University which modified the standards used to determine two important issues affecting the 
ability of faculty members at private-sector higher education institutions to unionize under the 
National Labor Relations Act: first, whether certain institutions and their faculty members are 
exempted from coverage of the Act due to their religious activities; and second, whether certain 
faculty members are managers, who are excluded from protection of the Act.  Both changes helped 
improve the prospects for unionizing faculty in the private sector. The NLRB Regional Directors, 
who decide election cases in the first instance, are now applying the new standards to address 
whether purportedly religious institutions are exempt from coverage (see cases listed under Pacific 
Luther University, infra section VII, A, 2) and whether faculty are managers (see cases listed under 
Pacific Lutheran University, infra section VII, B, 1). 
In addition, there are two pending cases before the Board involving the unionization of 
graduate students. (Columbia University, New School.) In the Columbia University case, the Board 
issued an invitation to file amicus briefs addressing whether the Board should modify or overrule 
its 2004 decision in Brown University, which had found that graduate assistants were not 
employees and therefore did not have statutory rights to unionize. Federal government actions 
addressing exemptions under the Fair Labor Standards Act and sexual misconduct under Title IX 
could also have significant ramifications for collective bargaining between unions and university 
employers. 
This year was also an active one for cases involving the First Amendment Rights of public 
sector faculty members. The lower courts began to apply the 2014 Supreme Court decision in Lane 
that held that a public employee’s speech that may concern their job, but is not ordinarily within 
the scope of their duties, is subject to First Amendment protection. Interesting decisions were also 
issued by state courts and labor relations boards in public sector collective bargaining cases. 
5
Nisenson: Annual Legal Update (2016)
Published by The Keep, 2016
 2 
 
II. First Amendment and Speech Rights 
 
A. Garcetti / Citizen Speech 
 
Lane v. Franks, 189 L. Ed. 2d 312 (U.S. 2014) 
In this Supreme Court case the Court held unanimously that a public employee’s speech 
that may concern their job, but is not ordinarily within the scope of their duties, is subject to First 
Amendment protection. The Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that Lane did not speak 
as a citizen when he was subpoena’d to testify in a criminal case, finding that Eleventh Circuit 
relied on too broad a reading of Garcetti. Garcetti does not transform citizen speech into employee 
speech simply because the speech involves subject matter acquired in the course of employment. 
The crucial component of Garcetti then, is, whether the speech “is itself ordinarily within the scope 
of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties.”  
Edward Lane was the director of Community Intensive Training for Youth (CITY), a 
program operated by Central Alabama Community College (CACC). Lane in the course of his 
duties as director conducted an audit of the program’s expenses and discovered that Suzanne 
Schmitz, an Alabama State Representative who was on CITY’s payroll, had not been reporting for 
work. As a result Lane terminated Schmitz’ employment. Federal authorities soon indicted 
Schmitz on charges of mail fraud and theft. Lane was subpoenaed and testified regarding the events 
that led to the termination of Schmitz at CITY. Schmitz was later convicted. Steve Franks, then 
CACC’s president, terminated Lane along with 28 other employees under the auspices of financial 
difficulties. Soon afterward, however, “Franks rescinded all but 2 of the 29 terminations—those 
of Lane and one other employee”. Lane sued alleging that Franks had violated the First 
Amendment by firing him in retaliation for testifying against Schmitz.  
 The District Court granted Franks’ motion for summary judgment, on the grounds that the 
individual-capacity claims were barred by qualified immunity and the official-capacity claims 
were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Circuit subsequently affirmed, holding 
that Lane spoke as an employee, not a citizen, because he acted in accordance to his official duties 
when he investigated and terminated Schmitz’ employment.  
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the disagreement among the Courts of 
Appeals as to “whether public employees may be fired—or suffer other adverse employment 
consequences—for providing truthful subpoenaed testimony outside the course of their ordinary 
job responsibilities”. 
The Court held that Lane’s speech was entitled to First Amendment protection. The Court 
explained that under Garcetti, the initial inquiry was into whether the case involved speech as a 
citizen, which may trigger First Amendment protection, or speech as an employee, which would 
not trigger such protection. In Lane the Court provided a more detailed explanation of employee 
versus citizen speech, and expanded the range of speech that is protected. The Court explained that 
“the mere fact that a citizen's speech concerns information acquired by virtue of his public 
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employment does not transform that speech into employee--rather than citizen--speech. The 
critical question under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope 
of an employee's duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties.” And the Court found that 
“Lane’s sworn testimony is speech as a citizen.”  
The Court further determined that Lane’s speech was protected under the First 
Amendment.  First, Lane’s speech about the corruption of a public program is “obviously” a matter 
of public concern and further that testimony within a judicial proceeding is a “quintessential 
example” of citizen speech. Second, the employer could not demonstrate any interest in limiting 
this speech to promote the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees or 
“that Lane unnecessarily disclosed sensitive, confidential, or privileged information”. 
The Court held that Franks could not be sued in his individual capacity on the basis of 
qualified immunity. Under that doctrine, courts should not award damages against a government 
official in their personal capacity unless “the official violated a statutory or constitutional right,” 
and “the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Because of the 
ambiguity of Eleventh Circuit precedent at the time of the conduct, the right was not “clearly 
established” and thus the test unsatisfied to defeat qualified immunity. Lane’s speech is entitled to 
First Amendment protection, but Franks is entitled to qualified immunity. As a result of this case 
the right is clearly established and is now the standard. 
 
B. Faculty Speech 
 
Cutler v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 767 F.3d 462 (5th Cir. 2014) 
In this case, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that it violated the termination of a 
faculty member for stating that a member of congress was a “fear monger” violated the First 
Amendment. Christian Cutler brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against university officials at 
Stephen F. Austin State University, alleging that he was fired in retaliation for exercising protected 
speech after telling a member of U.S. Representative Louie Gohmert's staff that Rep. Gohmert was 
a "fear monger." Cutler, the director of the University's art galleries, claimed that a member of 
Rep. Gohmert's staff called Cutler to invite him to judge a high school art exhibition that would be 
hosted by Rep. Gohmert in Tyler, Texas. Cutler asked for more details, but never received any. He 
then researched Rep. Gohmert on the internet, formed a negative impression of him, and decided 
to decline the invitation to judge the contest. Following an exchange of messages with members 
of Rep. Gohmert's staff, Cutler told a staff member he was not interested in judging the art show 
and made the "fear monger" comment. Cutler then received a letter from Rep. Gohmert, copying 
university president Dr. Baker Pattillo, expressing disappointment that the University would not 
host the competition. The university then gave Cutler a letter of termination. After Cutler was 
given the opportunity to resign and did so, he filed suit. 
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the law was clearly established and gave Defendants fair 
warning that terminating Cutler on the basis of his speech to Rep. Gohmert would violate Cutler's 
First Amendment rights. In reaching that decision, the Court assumed that Cutler alleged a 
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violation of his First Amendment rights because Defendants had effectively abandoned any 
argument that he did not. Based on the undisputed facts and making all reasonable inferences in 
Cutler's favor, the Fifth Circuit found that several of its pre-2010 decisions, which applied the 
general rule announced in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), to new fact patterns, should 
have given Defendants a clear warning that terminating Cutler because of his speech to Rep. 
Gohmert's office would violate Cutler's First Amendment rights. Cutler's speech was made 
externally to a staff member of a public official about participating in an event that was not within 
his job requirements. The concerns Cutler expressed during those conversations were unrelated to 
his job and emanated from his views as a citizen. 
 
Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d 402 (9th Cir. 2014) 
 In this important decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reinforced the 
First Amendment protections for academic speech by faculty members.  (Important note, a 
previous opinion by the Ninth Circuit in this case dated September 4, 2013 and published at 729 
F.3d 1011 was withdrawn and substituted with this opinion.) Adopting an approach advanced in 
AAUP’s amicus brief, the court emphasized the seminal importance of academic speech.  
Accordingly, the court concluded that the Garcetti analysis did not apply to "speech related to 
scholarship or teaching,” and therefore the First Amendment could protect this speech even when 
undertaken "pursuant to the official duties" of a teacher and professor.  
Professor Demers became a faculty member at Washington State University (WSU) WSU 
in 1996 and he obtained tenure in 1999.  Demers taught journalism and mass communications 
studies at the university in the Edward R. Murrow School of Communication.  Starting in 2008, 
Demers took issue with certain practices and policies of the School of Communication. Demers 
began to voice his criticism of the college and authored two publications entitled 7-Step Plan for 
Improving the Quality of the Edward R. Murrow School of Communication and The Ivory Tower 
of Babel. Demers sued the university and claimed that the university retaliated against him by 
lowering his rating in his annual performance evaluations and subjected him to an unwarranted 
internal audit in response to his open criticisms of administration decisions and because of his 
publications. 
The district court dismissed Demers’ First Amendment claim on the ground that Demers 
made his comments in connection with his duties as a faculty member.  Unlike most recent cases 
involving free speech infringement at public universities, the district court’s analysis did not center 
on the language from Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). Instead, the court applied a five 
part test set out by the Ninth Circuit in a series of public employee speech cases and found that 
Demers was not speaking as a private citizen on matters of public concern. Therefore, the district 
court found his speech was not protected by the First Amendment. 
Demers appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The AAUP joined with the Thomas Jefferson Center 
for the Protection of Free Expression to file an amicus brief in support of Demers.  The amicus 
brief argued that academic speech was not governed by the Garcetti analysis, but instead was 
governed by the balancing test established in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 US 563 
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(1968).  In two opinions, the Ninth Circuit agreed and issued a ruling that vigorously affirmed that 
the First Amendment protects the academic speech of faculty members.  
In an initial opinion issued on September 4, 2013, the Ninth Circuit held that Garcetti  did 
not apply to “teaching and writing on academic matters by teachers employed by the state,” even 
when undertaken "pursuant to the official duties" of a teacher or professor. Demers v. Austin, 729 
F.3d 1011 (September 4, 2013). Instead, as argued in the amicus brief, the court held that academic 
employee speech on such matters was protected under the Pickering balancing test. The court 
found that the pamphlet prepared by Demers was protected as it addressed a matter of public 
concern but remanded the case for further proceedings. The University filed a petition for panel 
rehearing and a petition for rehearing en banc. 
On January 29, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion 
denying the petition for panel rehearing and the petition for rehearing en banc and withdrawing 
and modifying its previous opinion. Originally, the court held that "teaching and writing on 
academic matters" by publicly-employed teachers could be protected by the First Amendment 
because they are governed by Pickering v. Board of Education, not by Garcetti v. Ceballos. In its 
2014 superseding opinion, the Ninth Circuit expanded that ruling to hold that Garcetti does not 
apply to "speech related to scholarship or teaching" and reaffirmed that “Garcetti does not – 
indeed, consistent with the First Amendment, cannot – apply to teaching and academic writing that 
are performed ‘pursuant to the official duties’ of a teacher and professor.”     
The Ninth Circuit held specifically that the 7-Step plan was “related to scholarship or 
teaching” within the meaning of Garcetti because “it was a proposal to implement a change at the 
Murrow School that, if implemented, would have substantially altered the nature of what was 
taught at the school, as well as the composition of the faculty that would teach it.” The court thus 
considered whether the Demers pamphlet was protected under the Pickering balancing test. 
Academic employee speech is protected under the First Amendment by the Pickering analysis if 
it is a (1) matter of public concern, and (2) outweighs the interest of the state in promoting 
efficiency of service. The court held that the pamphlet addressed a matter of “public concern” 
within the meaning of Pickering because it was broadly distributed and “contained serious 
suggestions about the future course of an important department of WSU.” The case was remanded 
to the district court, however, to determine (1) whether WSU had a “sufficient interest in 
controlling” the circulation of the plan, (2) whether the circulation was a “substantial motivating 
factor in any adverse employment action, and (3) whether the University would have taken the 
action in the absence of protected speech. 
 
C. Union Speech 
 
Meade v. Moraine Valley Cmty. College, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (N.D. Ill. March 3, 
2016) on remand from 770 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2014)  
In this case the United States district court applied a 2014 the U.S. Court of Appeals 
decision finding in favor of a contingent professor. In the appeals court case, the Seventh Circuit 
9
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greatly enhanced constitutional protection for outspoken critics of public college and 
university administrators. It reinforced and enhanced recent and congenial decisions in two other 
federal circuits in cases from Washington (Demers) and North Carolina (Adams). The court 
specifically relied on a sympathetic view of the Supreme Court’s judgment in the Garcetti case, 
expressly invoking the justices’ “reservation” of free speech and press protections for academic 
speakers and writers. The three-judge panel unanimously declared that an Illinois community 
college could not summarily dismiss an adjunct teacher for writing a letter criticizing the 
administration, at least as long as the issues she had raised publicly and visibly constituted “matters 
of public concern.” 
The federal appeals court also noted that even a contingent or part-time teacher had a 
reasonable expectation of continuing employment at the institution and therefore a protected 
property interest. The appellate court ruled that Robin Meade, the outspoken critic and active 
union officer, was “not alone in expressing concern about the treatment of adjuncts.” The panel 
added that “colleges and universities across the country are targets of increasing coverage and 
criticism regarding their use of adjunct faculty.” In this regard, the court broke important 
new ground not only with regard to academic freedom and professorial free expression, but even 
more strikingly in its novel embrace of the needs and interests of adjuncts and part-timers. 
On remand, the district court denied motions for summary judgment by both the College 
and Meade. One of the primary arguments advanced by the College was that the letter which 
prompted the termination addressed private interests and not matters of public concern. However, 
the court found that the Seventh Circuit had already ruled in favor of Meade on this issue. Since 
the College pointed to no evidence to show that the content of the letter was any different than it 
was on appeal, the court rejected its argument. Similarly, on the due process claims, the district 
court reiterated that the Seventh Circuit had rejected the college’s argument that because Meade’s 
classes could be cancelled, she had no property interest in her employment. As the lower court 
explained, “The mere fact that Meade might not end up teaching anticipated courses does not 
negate her protected property interest.” Therefore, the court rejected the college’s motion for 
summary judgment. The court also rejected Meade’s motion for summary judgment finding that 
there was not sufficient evidence to conclude as a matter of law that she was entitled to prevail on 
her claims without a trial.     
 
Meagher v. Andover Sch. Comm., 94 F. Supp. 3d 21 (D. Mass. 2015)  
In this case, a U.S. District in Massachusetts ruled that speech made by a teacher as a union 
representative was protected under the First Amendment finding that the Garcetti test did not apply 
because speech was not a part of her normal employment duties as clarified in Lane v. Franks.  
This case arose out of the September 2012 termination of the plaintiff, Jennifer Meagher 
("Meagher"), from her employment as a tenured teacher at Andover High School ("AHS") in 
Andover, Massachusetts. Prior to her termination, Meagher and other members of the teachers' 
union, the Andover Education Association ("AEA" or "Union"), were involved in contentious 
negotiations with the Andover School Committee over a new collective bargaining agreement. In 
10
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addition, AHS was engaged in the process of seeking re-accreditation pursuant to the standards 
established by the New England Association of Schools and Colleges ("NEASC"). The 
accreditation process centered on a self-study, which required teachers and administrators at AHS 
to conduct evaluations of the school's programs, prepare separate reports addressing one of seven 
accreditation standards, and present the reports to the faculty for approval. Under the NEASC 
guidelines, each report required approval by a two-thirds majority vote of the faculty. It was 
undisputed that Meagher was discharged from employment, effective September 17, 2012, 
because she sent an email to approximately sixty other teachers in which she urged them to enter 
an "abstain" vote on the ballots for each of the self-study reports as a means of putting the 
accreditation process on hold and using it to gain leverage in the collective bargaining negotiations. 
Meagher alleged that the decision to terminate her for writing and distributing the email to her 
colleagues constituted unlawful retaliation for, and otherwise interfered with, the exercise of her 
First Amendment right to engage in free speech.  
The fundamental issue was whether Meagher's email to her colleagues is entitled to 
protection under the First Amendment. Pursuant to Garcetti v. Ceballos, her speech would be 
protected if she were speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern rather than pursuant to 
her duties as a teacher when she distributed the communication, and if the value of her speech was 
not outweighed by the defendants' interest in preventing unnecessary disruptions to the efficient 
operation of the Andover public schools.  
In reviewing the facts, the court found that Meagher was speaking as a citizen. 
 
The record on summary judgment establishes that Meagher was speaking as a 
citizen, and not an employee of the Andover School Department, when she 
distributed the June 10, 2012 email at issue in this case. There is no dispute that 
Meagher wrote the email on her personal, home computer, and distributed it to her 
colleagues using her personal email account. Moreover, there is no dispute that she 
sent the communication during non-working hours, that she contacted the recipients 
using their personal email accounts, and that the email concerned issues that were 
addressed in the press and triggered considerable discussion among members of the 
local com-munity. The substance of the email, in which Meagher advocated use of 
the "abstain" option on the ballots for the self-study reports as a means of delaying 
the NEASC re-accreditation process and gaining leverage in the contract dispute 
between the Union and the ASC, would not have given objective observers the 
impression that Meagher was representing her employer when she communicated 
with her colleagues. . . . Accordingly, the record demonstrates that Meagher was 
working in her capacity as a Union activist rather than in her capacity as a high 
school English teacher, when she distributed the communication in question. 
 
The court also found that the value of Meagher's speech outweighed any interest that the 
defendants had in preventing unnecessary disruptions and inefficiencies in the workplace. 
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Therefore, the court found that Meagher’s speech was protected and that her termination violated 
her rights under the First Amendment.  
 
D. Exclusive Representation 
 
D'Agostino v. Baker, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 2023 (1st Cir. Feb. 5, 2016) 
This was one of several lawsuits in which anti-union plaintiffs challenged the long 
established rights of unions to exclusively represent employees in public sector bargaining. In a 
decision written by former Supreme Court Justice David Souter, the Court firmly rejected the 
plaintiffs’ claims. The court explained, that non-union public employees have no cognizable claim 
that their First Amendment associational rights were violated by the union acting as an exclusive 
bargaining agent with the state. The court explained,   
 
. . . that result is all the clearer under Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. 
Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 104 S. Ct. 1058, 79 L. Ed. 2d 299 (1984), which ruled against First 
Amendment claims brought by public college faculty members, professional employees of 
a state education system, who challenged a legislative mandate that a union selected as 
their exclusive bargaining agent be also the exclusive agent to meet with officials on 
educational policy beyond the scope of mandatory labor bargaining. The Court held that 
neither a right to speak nor a right to associate was infringed, id. at 289; like the appellants 
here, the academic employees in Knight could speak out publicly on any subject and were 
free to associate themselves together outside the union however they might desire. Their 
academic role was held to give them no variance from the general rules that there is no 
right to compel state officials to listen to them, id. at 286, and no right to eliminate the 
amplification that an exclusive agent necessarily enjoys in speaking for the unionized 
majority, id. at 288. 
 
The Court also rejected the Plaintiffs attempts to use the recent Supreme Court decision in 
Harris v. Quinn, 189 L. Ed. 2d 620 (U.S. 2014) to justify their claims.  
Two district courts have similarly read Knight as confirming that exclusive representation 
by a union does not infringe non-members' associational rights. See Jarvis v. Cuomo, 2015 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 56443 (N.D.N.Y Apr. 30, 2015)(Addressed in the 2015 Legal Updated); Bierman v. 
Dayton, No. 14-3021, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150504, 2014 WL 5438505, at *7 (D. Minn. Oct. 
22, 2014). 
 
E. Agency Fee 
 
Harris v. Quinn, 189 L. Ed. 2d 620 (U.S. 2014) 
On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court issued its much awaited decision in the Harris case 
in which the plaintiffs requested that the Court rule unconstitutional the charging of agency fees 
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in the public sector.  The Court rejected these attempts to alter the agency fee jurisprudence as it 
has existed in the public sector for over 35 years since the Court issued its seminal decision in 
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977).  Here, in a 5 to 4 opinion issued by 
Justice Alito, the Court questioned the foundation of Abood, but specifically stated that it was 
unnecessary for the Court to reach the argument that Abood should be overruled.  Instead, the 
Court ruled that agency fees could not be imposed on certain “partial-public” employees, a 
category that likely has little applicability to faculty members at public institutions. However, the 
Court’s majority decision questioned the underlying validity of Abood, and prompted lawsuits and 
appeals directly challenging whether the charging of agency fees in the public sector is 
constitutional, leading to the Friedrichs case. (See 2015 Legal Update for further details regarding 
the Court’s decision in Harris.)   
 
Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, U.S. Supreme Court Case No. 14-915, 
argued (Jan. 11, 2016) 
This case involves a claim that charging agency fees to non-members to support union 
representation in the public sector is unconstitutional. The case started when the plaintiffs, 
sponsored by organizations seeking to weaken unions, sued the California Teachers Association 
and a local California school district seeking to invalidate agency fee provisions in the collective 
bargaining agreement, arguing that agency fee clauses in the public sector violate the First 
Amendment.  On June 29, 2015 the Supreme Court granted certiorari, and thereby agreed to hear 
the appeal. The AAUP amicus brief argues that collective bargaining, supported by the agency fee 
system, significantly benefits the educational system, and that removal of the ability to charge 
agency fees would upset the balance set by the states and burden the rights of union members.  
Agency fee has been deemed constitutional since the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision 
in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education. In Harris v. Quinn, the Supreme Court declined to 
overrule Abood, although the Court raised questions regarding its vitality. Anti-union groups 
brought the Friedrichs case in California and pushed it through the courts.  In the Supreme Court, 
the Friedrichs plaintiffs have advanced the argument that all agency fee arrangements in the public 
sector violate the First Amendment as they compel non-members to pay for activities that they 
believe address matters of public concern.  The plaintiffs also argued in the alternative that even if 
some agency fee system is constitutional, the current opt-out system of charging agency fee payers 
in unconstitutional.  
The Supreme Court accepted two questions for review: (1) Whether Abood v. Detroit 
Board of Education should be overruled and public-sector “agency shop” arrangements invalidated 
under the First Amendment; and (2) whether it violates the First Amendment to require that public 
employees affirmatively object to subsidizing nonchargeable speech by public-sector unions.  
Given the questions before the Court there are several potential outcomes. First, the Court 
could answer “no” to both questions, and leave the law status quo. Second, the Court could answer 
the first question in the affirmative, and it would overrule Abood and prohibit agency fee in the 
public sector. This would impose a right to work style system nationwide in the public 
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sector.  (This would render the second question before the Court moot.)  Third, the Court could 
answer the first question “no”, thereby allowing agency fee, but could answer the second question 
“yes”. The second question addresses the current law regarding agency fee payers and objectors. 
Under the current law, non-members can be charged a rate equivalent to full union dues unless 
they affirmatively object. Once a non-member affirmatively objects, they can only be charged the 
agency fee rate. This creates an “opt-out” situation in which non-members must affirmatively opt 
out to pay the lower agency fee rate. If the Court answered the second question “yes”, then agency 
fee would still be permissible, but all non-members would be considered objectors automatically 
and could therefore only be charged the lower agency fee rate.  Finally, in answering the questions, 
the Court could leave some charges for agency fee standing, while substantially changing the 
amount that can be permissibly collected. For example, the Court could narrow the types of activity 
for which agency fees can be charged, such as by excluding from chargeable activity work such 
as bargaining for tenure or pay. It is difficult to anticipate what such a ruling would look like. 
On November 13, 2015 AAUP filed with American Federation of Teachers, an amicus 
brief before the Supreme Court arguing that the payment of agency fees by non-members in 
collective bargaining unions to support union representation is constitutional. The amicus brief 
supports the charging of agency fees and provides examples from AAUP higher education chapters 
of the benefits of the agency fee system. The brief provides strong arguments in favor of the agency 
fee system including that agency fees are an essential component of the states’ management of 
some of their most important institutions; that petitioners’ facial, all-or-nothing challenge to all 
aspects of every agency fee ever charged anywhere, on the basis of no record at all, should be 
rejected on its face; and that to the extent the court entertains petitioners’ facial claim, it must 
account for petitioners’ failure to challenge the underlying regime of exclusive representation in 
collective bargaining.  The brief explains that “fair share fees are . . . used to fund a wide range of 
. . . activities that promote the state’s compelling interest in providing students a high quality 
education and directly benefit nonmembers.” Thus, based on the significant benefits provided by 
agency fees, compared to the minimal burdens, charging agency fees to non-members does not 
violate the First Amendment. 
The Supreme Court heard oral argument in the Friederichs case on Monday, January 11, 
2016.  In a turn of historical significance, the death of Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia will 
have repercussions for Friedrichs.  While no one knows for sure what will happen, Scalia's death 
strengthens the likelihood that the forty years of precedent finding agency fees constitutional will 
not be overturned in this case.  
 
Jarvis v. Cuomo, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6218 (N.D.N.Y Jan. 20, 2016) 
 
 This case involved disputes regarding the refund of agency fees collected from non-union 
members who were partial public employees under the Supreme Court’s decision in Harris v. 
Quinn, 189 L. Ed. 2d 620 (U.S. 2014).  The plaintiffs were individuals operating home child care 
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businesses. They are covered by the Supreme Court’s decision in Harris which ruled that 
collection of agency fees from these individuals violated to the First Amendment.  
After the Harris decision was issued, the Union and the employer negotiated a new 
collective bargaining agreement that did not require the deduction of agency fees. The union also 
rebated to the plaintiffs agency fees that were collected after the Supreme Court issued its decision 
in Harris. The plaintiffs continued to prosecute their suit arguing that the Union was obligated to 
rebate them for agency fees paid prior to the Court’s decision in Harris.  
The district court found that the Union was not obligated to make such a reimbursement as 
the union relied in good faith when it collected the agency fees prior to Harris. The Court 
explained,  
 
Plaintiffs' Complaint does not contain any allegations that CSEA acted in bad faith in 
collecting the fee prior to Harris. To the contrary, the record indicates that CSEA acted in 
good faith when relying on the validly enacted state legislation that authorized the fair share 
fee as well as prior Supreme Court precedent authorizing a similar payment assessment in 
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 97 S. Ct. 1782, 52 L. Ed. 2d 261 (1971). 
Moreover, the Court finds that Defendants took reasonable measures to make Plaintiffs 
whole after the Harris decision was issued. Accordingly, the Court finds that the good-faith 
defense applies to the CSEA Defendants and therefore, they cannot be liable for damages 
based on the collection of fees from Plaintiffs prior to July 1, 2014. 
 
III. FOIA/Subpoenas and Academic Freedom 
 
Energy & Environment Legal Institute v. Arizona Board of Regents, Case No. 2CACV-
2015-0086 (Ariz. App. Ct., Second App. Div., Dec. 3, 2015) (unpublished)  
In a case in which the AAUP filed an amicus brief, the Arizona Court of Appeals remanded 
a dispute involving a request for climate scientists’ research records so that the trial court could 
weigh de novo the University’s “contention that disclosure of the records would be detrimental to 
the best interests of the state against the presumption in favor of disclosure.”  The case arose from 
a public records request for extensive material from two climate scientists submitted by a legal 
foundation seeking to use records requests in an attempt to “put false science on trial.” The AAUP 
filed an amicus brief with the Arizona Court of Appeals, and earlier with the trial court, arguing 
that academic freedom to conduct research is essential to a vital university system, and to the 
common good, and warranted protecting certain research records from disclosure.  
This case arose from a lawsuit filed by Energy & Environment Legal Institute, a “free 
market” legal foundation using public records requests in a campaign against climate science. E & 
E, previously known as the American Tradition Institute, brought similar cases involving public 
records requests of faculty members, including in the case of American Tradition Institute v. 
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Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 756 S.E.2d 435 (Va. 2014), in which the AAUP 
filed an amicus brief successfully opposing the ATI records request. 
E & E submitted public records requests that targeted two University of Arizona faculty 
members, climate researchers Professors Malcolm Hughes and Jonathan Overpeck. E & E sought 
emails authored by or addressed or copied to them. The emails were, in turn, linked to eight other 
individuals, each of whom is or was then a professor or researcher at another private or public 
university. As E & E counsel has stated, the suit is supposedly intended to “put false science on 
trial” and E & E vows to “keep peppering universities around the country with similar requests 
under state open records laws.” The case was originally heard by the Superior Court in Pima 
County Arizona in late 2014. 
The AAUP filed an amicus brief in the lower court on September 25, 2014. The brief 
argued, “when public records requests target information that implicates principles of academic 
freedom, courts must balance the public’s general right to disclosure against the significant chilling 
effects that will result from forcing scholars and institutions to disclose collegial academic 
communications and internal deliberative materials.” On March 24, 2015, the court ruled that the 
University did not have to disclose the records. The decision noted that the argument regarding the 
potential chilling effect of the disclosures was key to the decision.  
E &E appealed this decision to the Arizona Court of Appeals. On October 23, 2015, the 
AAUP filed a brief in support of the University and the scientists. The brief was drafted by AAUP 
General Counsel Risa Lieberwitz, with input from AAUP Litigation Committee members, local 
Arizona Counsel Don Awerkamp and others. The brief argued that academic freedom warranted 
protecting the research records from disclosure. One key consideration under Arizona law is 
whether disclosure is “in the best interests of the state.” The brief explained that “Courts should 
consider the best interests of the state to maintain a free and vital university system, which depends 
on the protection of academic freedom to engage in the free and open scientific debate necessary 
to create high quality academic research. Where the requests seek prepublication communications 
and other unpublished academic research materials, as in the case at bar, compelled disclosure 
would have a severe chilling effect on intellectual debate among researchers and scientists.”  
In its decision, the Court of Appeals focused solely on the burden of proof applied by the 
trial court and did not address the substantive question regarding whether the release of the records 
was appropriate. The trial court had ruled that the issue was whether the University had abused its 
discretion or acted arbitrarily or capriciously in refusing to disclose the records. The Court of 
Appeals determined that this was not the appropriate burden of proof. The Court of Appeals held 
“the trial court was required de novo to weigh the [University’s] contention that disclosure of the 
records would be detrimental to the best interests of the state against the presumption in favor of 
disclosure. Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the court’s order pertaining to e-mails addressing 
‘prepublication critical analysis, unpublished data, analysis, research, results, drafts and 
commentary’ and remand so that the court may balance the countervailing interests and determine 
whether E&E is entitled to access those e-mails.” (Citations omitted.) On remand the trial court 
will again need to consider the argument that disclosure of such research records is not in the best 
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interests of the state as the disclosure harms academic freedom and would have a severe chilling 
effect on intellectual debate.  
 
Highland Mining Company v. West Virginia University School of Medicine, 774 S.E.2d 
36 (W.V. 2015) 
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia shielded from disclosure a former West 
Virginia University researcher’s records of his work concerning the health effects of mountaintop-
removal mining. The order the granting in part and denying in part Highland Mining Company's 
(Highland) request for documents related to several articles co-authored by a professor from the 
West Virginia University School of Medicine (WVU). The scholar, Michael Hendryx, led a 
research project that found that people living near mountaintop-removal mines faced higher risks 
of cancer and premature death. A mining company had sued the university for access to records of 
Mr. Hendryx’s research. 
The court held that pursuant to the West Virginia Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 
WVU may use FOIA's "internal memorandum" exemption to withhold documents that reflect the 
professor's deliberative process. The court explained that the “involuntary public disclosure” of 
the professor’s research documents “would expose the decision-making process in such a way as 
to hinder candid discussion of WVU’s faculty and undermine WVU’s ability to perform its 
operations”. However, the court also ruled that the University could not invoke FOIA's "personal 
privacy" exemption to protect documents containing anonymous peer review comments of the 
draft articles (although those documents would be exempt from disclosure under the "internal 
memoranda" exemption). Finally, the court concluded that WVU may not claim an "academic 
freedom" privilege to avoid the plain language of FOIA because the state does not have an 
academic-freedom exemption to its public-records law. 
 
The American Tradition Institute and Honorable Delegate Robert Marshall v. Rector & 
Visitors of the University of Virginia & Michael Mann, 756 S.E.2d 435 (Va. 2014) 
In this case the Virginia Supreme Court unanimously ruled that a professor’s climate 
research records were exempt from disclosure under the Virginia Freedom of Information Act as 
academic research records.  The Court explained that the exclusion of University research records 
from disclosure was intended to prevent “harm to university-wide research efforts, damage to 
faculty recruitment and retention, undermining of faculty expectations of privacy and 
confidentiality, and impairment of free thought and expression.” While the decision was limited 
to a Virginia statute, it provided a strong rationale for the defense of academic records from 
disclosure. (See 2014 Legal Update for further details regarding the Court’s decision.) 
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IV. Tenure, Due Process, Breach of Contract, and Pay 
 
A. Tenure – Breach of Contract 
 
Langenkamp v. New York University, Case 14-3861 (2nd Cir. Oct. 15, 2015).  
A professor was terminated and she argued that the university’s offer of employment 
including an agreement to abide by all university policies including the faculty handbook 
constituted a breach of contract. The faculty handbook specified procedures for the university to 
follow before terminating an employee. Although New York has a well-established at-will 
employment doctrine, the court narrowly ruled that the professor’s breach of contract claim be 
remanded for further proceedings. The policies in a personnel manual specifying the employer’s 
practices with respect to the employment relationship, including procedures or grounds for 
termination, may become part of the employment contact IF (i) an express written policy limiting 
the employer’s right of discharge exists, (ii) the employer made the employee aware of this policy, 
and (iii) the employee detrimentally relied on the policy in accepting or continuing employment.  
 
Salaita v. Kennedy, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102854 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 2015)  
Professor Salaita was offered, and accepted, a tenured position at the University of Illinois, 
to begin in August 2014, but on August 1, in response to angry tweets by the professor, he was 
notified by the university’s chancellor that she would not take the ordinarily routine step of 
submitting the appointment to the board of trustees for approval. Professor Salaita sued arguing 
that the refusal to appoint him to the tenured position was a breach of contract and violated his 
constitutional rights. The court denied the university’s motion to dismiss and ruled that the 
professor’s contract was not negated by the "subject to approval by the Board of Trustees" 
language in his letter. The court reasoned that this language was simply a part of the university's 
performance, since everything else about the letter, and the university's subsequent conduct, 
indicated that a binding contract had been made once the professor signed a form at the bottom of 
the letter indicating his formal acceptance. The court noted that, "the University's argument, if 
applied consistently, would wreak havoc" in academia: "the entire American academic hiring 
process as it now operates would cease to exist, because no professor would resign a tenure 
position, move states and start teaching at a new college based on an 'offer' that was absolutely 
meaningless until after the semester already started." The court also ruled that the professor had a 
viable claim for violation of his due process rights, since the contract gave him a "property interest" 
in his job. The decision is a victory for the AAUP, who censured the university in June 2015.   
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B. Tenure – Constitutionality  
 
Vergara v. California, Case No. B258589 argued (Calif. App. Ct., Second App. Dist. 
Feb. 25, 2016) 
This case involves an appeal to the California Court of Appeal contesting a ruling by a 
California state court judge that found that California statutes providing tenure protections to K–
12 teachers violated the equal protection provisions of the California constitution. The case arose 
from a challenge, funded by anti-union organizations, to five California statutes that provide 
primary and secondary school teachers a two-year probationary period, stipulate procedural 
protections for non-probationary teachers facing termination, and emphasize teacher seniority in 
reductions of force. The trial court judge held that the statutes unconstitutionally impact students’ 
constitutional right to equality of education and disproportionately burden poor and minority 
students. The amicus brief contesting this decision argued that the challenged statutes help protect 
teachers from retaliation, help keep good teachers in the classroom by promoting teacher longevity 
and discouraging teacher turnover, and allow teachers to act in students’ interests in presenting 
curricular material and advocating for students within the school system. 
The challenged statutes in the California Education Code establish: a two-year 
probationary period during which new teachers may be terminated without cause, due process 
protections for non-probationary teachers facing termination for cause, and procedures for 
implementing budget-based reductions-in-force. After an eight-week bench trial, Los Angeles 
Superior Court Judge Rolf Michael Treu, in a short sixteen-page opinion containing only 
superficial analysis, adopted the plaintiffs’ theories in full, striking down each challenged statute 
as unconstitutional. In doing so, Judge Treu improperly used the “strict scrutiny” standard and 
failed to adequately consider the substantial state interest in providing statutory rights of tenure 
and due process for K–12 teachers in the public schools.  
Instead, Judge Treu accepted wholesale testimony given by the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses. 
Based on this testimony, the court concluded that “the specific effect of grossly ineffective teachers 
on students . . . shocks the conscience” and that “there are a significant number of grossly 
ineffective teachers currently active in California classrooms” who have “a direct, real, 
appreciable, and negative impact on a significant number of California students . . . .” Although 
he did not cite evidence showing a causal link between the statutes and students’ constitutional 
rights, Judge Treu held that the statutes unconstitutionally impact students’ fundamental right to 
equality of education and disproportionately burden poor and minority students. Judge Treu stayed 
his ruling pending appeal. The State Defendants and Intervenors California Teachers Association 
and California Federation of Teachers appealed to the Court of Appeal of the State of California 
for the Second Appellate District. 
The AAUP filed an amicus brief in support of tenure. The AAUP has a particular interest 
in defending the due process protections of tenure at all levels of education. The brief, primarily 
authored by Professor Charlotte Garden, an expert in labor law and constitutional law and litigation 
director of the Korematsu Center for Law & Equality at Seattle University, advanced two 
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substantive arguments. First, the brief explained that by helping to insulate teachers from backlash 
or retaliation, the challenged statutes allow teachers to act in students’ interests in deciding when 
and how to present curricular material and to advocate for students within their schools and 
districts. In so doing, the brief recognized the distinction between the academic freedom rights of 
primary and secondary school teachers and those of professors in colleges and universities. 
Second, the brief argued that students are better off when good teachers remain in their classrooms, 
and the challenged statutes promote teacher longevity and discourage teacher turnover.  
Oral arguments in Vergara v. State of California were heard on Thursday, February 25 in 
Los Angeles. The three-judge panel has 90 days to reach a decision. However, both sides have said 
they intend to appeal if they lose this case, so it is likely that the case will move on to the California 
Supreme Court. 
 
C. Faculty Handbooks 
 
Report of the NLRB General Counsel Concerning Employer Rules, NLRB GC 15_04, 
(NLRB General Counsel March 18, 2015) 
The General Counsel for the National Labor Relations Board recently published a 
guidance memorandum that provides specific examples of lawful and unlawful employee 
handbook rules in the areas of confidentiality, professionalism and employee conduct, use of 
company logos, copyrights and trademarks, conflicts of interest, photography and recording, and 
interaction with the media and other third parties.  
The NLRB and its General Counsel have aggressively scrutinized many frequently used 
employee handbook provisions for potentially infringing on the right of employees to engage in 
concerted activity protected under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). In 
addition to the right to engage in union organizing, Section 7 activity includes the right to 
discuss, challenge, question, and advocate changes in wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment in both unionized and non-unionized work environments. The NLRB 
will deem an employee handbook provision to violate the NLRA if it specifically prohibits 
Section 7 activity or if "employees would reasonably construe" the rule as prohibiting such 
activity. It is this "reasonably construe" language that has resulted in many common employee 
handbook provisions being declared unlawful by the NLRB. 
The guidance section that may be most applicable to faculty members is one that 
addresses the legality of employer rules regarding the conduct of employees towards the 
University and supervisors or management. The General Counsel explained. 
 
Employees also have the Section 7 right to criticize or protest their employer's 
labor policies or treatment of employees. Thus, rules that can reasonably be read 
to prohibit protected concerted criticism of the employer will be found unlawfully 
overbroad. For instance, a rule that prohibits employees from engaging in 
"disrespectful," "negative," "inappropriate," or "rude" conduct towards the 
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employer or management, absent sufficient clarification or context, will usually 
be found unlawful.  See Casino San Pablo, 361 NLRB No. 148, slip op. at 3 (Dec. 
16, 2014). Moreover, employee criticism of an employer will not lose the Act's 
protection simply because the criticism is false or defamatory, so a rule that bans 
false statements will be found unlawfully overbroad unless it specifies that only 
maliciously false statements are prohibited. Id. at 4. On the other hand, a rule that 
requires employees to be respectful and professional to coworkers, clients, or 
competitors, but not the employer or management, will generally be found lawful, 
because employers have a legitimate business interest in having employees act 
professionally and courteously in their dealings with coworkers, customers, 
employer business partners, and other third parties. 
 
Similar language may be used in University policies or handbooks, particularly in 
relation to “civility clauses.” However, employees should be cautious as this is a complicated 
area, and simply because it appears a portion of the manual may be covered by the above does 
not mean that a faculty member can avoid termination for violating the manual. 
 
D. Overtime Pay  
 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Defining and Delimiting the Exemption for Executive, 
Administrative, Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 80 Fed. Reg. 
38515 (Dept. of Labor July 6, 2015) 
This notice involves the standards under which employees are considered “exempt”, and 
therefore not entitled to overtime pay, under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Department of 
Labor (DOL)’s Wage and Hour Division (WHD) has proposed revisions to the executive, 
administrative and professional exemptions — known as the “white collar” exemptions — under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act. Under the current regulations, an individual must satisfy three 
criteria to qualify as an exempt  “white collar” employee: first, he or she must be paid on a 
salaried basis (the salary basis test); second, that salary must be at least $455/week, or $23,660 
annually (the minimum salary requirement or salary threshold); and third, his or her “primary 
duties” must be consistent with executive, professional or administrative positions as defined by 
DOL (the primary duties test). Note that the first two criteria do not apply to professors, teachers 
and many student workers. 
In order to maintain the effectiveness of the salary level test, the DOL proposed to set the 
standard salary level equal to the 40th percentile of earnings for full-time salaried workers 
(projected to be $50,440 for a full-year worker in the first quarter of 2016).  The DOL also 
proposed to set the highly compensated employee annual compensation level equal to the 90th 
percentile of earnings for full-time salaried workers ($122,148 annually), up from the current 
$100,000 threshold. Furthermore, in order to prevent the levels from becoming outdated, the 
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DOL proposed including in the regulations a mechanism to automatically update the salary and 
compensation thresholds on an annual basis using either a fixed percentile of wages or the CPI-
U.  
DOL is also considering making changes to the duties tests. No changes are proposed to 
the primary duties test, but WHD has asked several questions on the topic, suggesting it is 
considering adopting a quantification requirement similar to California’s, where employees have 
to perform the exempt primary duties “more than 50 percent” of the time. Although the DOL 
hasn’t suggested changing the executive, administrative, professional, computer or outside sales 
duties tests, it did ask for comments on whether the tests should be changed and whether they’re 
working to screen out employees who are not bona fide white collar exempt employees. 
Any substantial changes issued by the DOL could result in significant changes to the 
salaries and working conditions of University employees (though likely excluding most faculty 
and student workers.) Such chances could of course trigger bargaining obligations or 
opportunities.  
 
 
V. Discrimination and Affirmative Action  
 
A. Affirmative Action in Admissions 
 
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, cert granted 135 S. Ct. 2888 (June 29, 2015) 
This is the second time the Supreme Court has considered Fisher’s challenge to the use of 
race as a consideration in the University of Texas’ holistic admission process, and the fourth time 
AAUP has joined an amicus brief in the case.  
The case arose when Abigail Fisher, a white student, challenged the university's 
consideration of race in the undergraduate admissions process when she was denied admission. 
Fisher argued that UT Austin's use of race in admissions decisions violated her right to equal 
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1996, the Texas Legislature adopted the Top 10 
Percent Law. Under this law, seniors in the top 10 percent of their high school class were 
guaranteed admission to any Texas state university. The primary objective of the law is to draw 
in the best students from each Texas school, including students from predominantly black or 
Hispanic areas, in order to achieve higher levels of diversity. Following the Supreme Court 
upholding a race-conscious admissions program at the University of Michigan Law School in 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), UT Austin reinstated a consideration of race in 
admissions decisions for those who did not fall within the Top 10 Percent Law. 
Fisher filed a lawsuit challenging UT Austin’s decision to deny her admission. The case 
was first heard by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2010, and the AAUP signed onto the 
American Council on Education (ACE) amicus brief submitted to the Fifth Circuit.  The Fifth 
Circuit ruled in favor of UT Austin and the Fifth Circuit’s first decision was appealed to the 
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Supreme Court in 2012. In that appeal, the question presented was whether the Supreme Court's 
decisions interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, including 
Grutter, permitted UT Austin's use of race in undergraduate admissions decisions. Fisher 
claimed that either this use of race did not fall into the constitutional parameters of Grutter or 
that Grutter must be overturned. In August 2012, the AAUP signed onto an amicus brief 
authored by ACE with 39 other higher education groups. The amici argued that the educational 
benefits that come from a diverse student body are a compelling state interest and, second, 
colleges and universities must be allowed to make autonomous decisions when determining the 
composition of their student bodies.  
On June 24, 2013, by a vote of 7 to 1, the Supreme Court followed long standing 
precedent and recognized that colleges and universities have a compelling interest in ensuring 
student body diversity, and can take account of an individual applicant’s race as one of several 
factors in their admissions program as long as the program is narrowly tailored to achieve that 
compelling interest. Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013)(Fisher I). 
The Supreme Court, however, ruled that the court below had not properly applied the “strict 
scrutiny” standard and remanded the case back to the Fifth Circuit.  In November 2013, the 
AAUP again signed onto ACE’s amicus brief to the Fifth Circuit which reiterated the arguments 
enumerated above. In July 2014, for the second time the Fifth Circuit upheld the UT Austin 
admissions plan. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014). Fisher petitioned 
to have the Supreme Court review the case (again) and that request was granted on June 29, 
2015.  
In Fisher II, the AAUP joined an amicus brief filed on October 30, 2015 in the Supreme 
Court arguing that consideration of race in the admission process was appropriate. For many 
years, AAUP has taken a leadership role in affirmative action debates by emphasizing the 
educational value of diversity.  As early as 1978, AAUP filed an amicus brief in Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke to protect the primacy of the faculty role in developing 
educationally appropriate admissions criteria. In addition, AAUP policy has long supported the 
value of diversity in education.  See, e.g. “Affirmative Action Plans: Recommended Procedures 
for Increasing the Number of Minority Persons and Women on College and University 
Faculties,” AAUP, Policy Documents and Reports, 157-163 (11th ed. 2015). In continuing this 
tradition, the AAUP joined the amicus brief in Fisher II, authored by ACE and joined by 37 
other higher education organizations.  
The Fisher II amicus brief argued that the interest in a diverse student body is compelling 
because it is grounded in educational benefit; and that interest is rooted in educational judgment. 
In Grutter and Fisher I, the Supreme Court made clear that when an institution sets its 
educational goals—including a goal of attaining the educational benefit of a diverse student 
body—it makes an educational judgment that merits judicial regard. That interest can also justify 
narrowly tailored consideration of race in admissions as part of holistic review of individual 
applicants. Narrow tailoring should not be interpreted to forbid race-conscious holistic review 
simply because the review operates concurrently with race-neutral mechanisms. Thus the brief 
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concluded that the Supreme Court has permitted institutions to take race into account as a 
consideration in the admissions decision, and it should continue to do so.   
 
B. Sexual Misconduct – Title IX  
  
Letter from Office of Civil Rights, Department of Education, (Feb. 17, 2016)  
This letter from the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) responded to an inquiry from 
Congressman James Lankford who posed several questions regarding OCR’s position and the 
status of its 2010 and 2011 “Dear Colleague” letters. In addressing one important issue, the OCR 
confirmed that these Dear Colleague letters do not have the force of law or regulation. OCR 
explained “it is Title IX and the regulation, which has the force and effect of law, . . . not OCR’s 
2011 (or any other)” Dear Colleague letter. “Instead, OCR”s guidance is issued to advise the 
public of its construction of the statutes and regulations it administers and enforces.” The fact 
that these “Dear Colleague” letters do not have the force of law could have significant 
consequences if colleges and universities seek to use the letters to justify abrogating prior 
agreements or established policies.    
  
Sanning v. Board of Trustees of Whitman College, Case No. 4:15-cv-05055 (E.D. Wa. 
Dec. 9, 2015) 
This case arose from the termination of a Professor by Whitman College as the result of a 
Title IX investigation. The plaintiff alleged that in terminating the professor, the College violated 
its own policies and procedures and discriminated against him based on sex. One of the primary 
arguments advanced by the college was that it was required by law, in the form of the OCR’s 
“Dear Colleague” letters, to depart from its own policies and procedures. In a short ruling, the 
court found that there were sufficient allegations that the College treated Sanning differently 
because of his sex which supposedly “led to a process which violated the Grievance Policy 
adopted by Whitman and ultimately lead to Sanning’s employment being terminated.” Therefore, 
the court denied the College’s motion to dismiss the case.  
 
VI. Intellectual Property  
 
A. Patent and Copyright Cases 
 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), Section 1201 Rulemaking: Sixth 
Triennial Proceeding to Determine Exemptions to the Prohibition on Circumvention 
(Libr. of Congress Oct. 30, 2015)  
Section 1201 of the Copyright Act, which was part of the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (DMCA) of 1998, bars the “circumvention” of “technological protection measures” that 
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control access to copyrighted works. Every three years the Librarian of Congress (advised by the 
Copyright Office) issues a set of exceptions to the 1201 rules to allow for lawful uses that might 
otherwise be discouraged by the law. Educators have participated in this process, which began in 
2000, for many years, and have successfully obtained exceptions that have grown incrementally 
over time to encompass more uses, more types of media, and more users.  
AAUP signed onto Public and Reply Comments submitted to the U.S. Copyright Office 
authored by the Glushko-Samuelson Intellectual Property Clinic at the American University 
Washington College of Law, and the Intellectual Property, Arts, and Technology Clinic, 
University of California, Irvine School of Law, which support faculty use of excerpts of certain 
audiovisual material and research for educational purposes.  
On October 30, 2015, the Library of Congress announced its exemptions to DMCA---the 
new rules allow documentary filmmakers and authors offering film analysis to access encrypted 
content from DVDs, Blu-ray discs and digitally transmitted video in order to criticize or comment 
on that content in their works. The previous version of this rule did not permit these creators to 
access Blu-ray; and the new rules also allow faculty and in some cases students to copy short 
portions of protected works for use in criticism or commentary where close analysis of the clip is 
necessary for the following formats: DVD, streaming video delivery and BLU-RAY. The prior 
rules allowed use of DVD and streaming for these purposes, but BLU-RAY is new to this cycle.   
  
Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2014) 
In this case the Second Circuit recently ruled that various universities (collectively referred 
to as “HathiTrust”) did not violate the Copyright Act of 1976 when they digitally reproduced 
books, owned by the universities’ respective libraries, as the doctrine of "fair use" allowed them 
to create a full-text searchable database of copyrighted works and to provide those works in 
formats accessible to those with disabilities. (See 2014 Legal Update for further details regarding 
the Court’s decision.) 
 
 
VII. Collective Bargaining Cases and Issues – Private Sector 
 
A. NLRB Authority  
 
1. Recess Appointments 
 
Noel Canning v. NLRB, 189 L. Ed. 2d 538 (2014)   
On June 26, 2014, the U.S Supreme Court unanimously invalidated three appointments to 
the NLRB because they did not meet the requirements of the Recess Appointments Clause. (See 
2014 Legal Update for further details regarding the Court’s decision.) 
The case arose when, in January 2012, President Obama filled three vacancies on the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) through recess appointments, after a Senate minority had 
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used the filibuster rule to block a Senate vote on the nominees. Under the Constitution’s Recess 
Appointments Clause, “The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen 
during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the end of their 
next Session.” U.S. Const. art II, § 2, cl. 3. The three NLRB appointments preserved a quorum in 
the agency, allowing it to conduct business. During this period, from December 17, 2011 to 
January 23, 2012, the Senate held pro forma sessions during which no business was conducted but 
the Senate was not adjourned for more than three days. The President asserted that the Senate was 
in recess despite these pro forma sessions, giving him authority to exercise his recess-appointment 
power during this period.  
The U.S Supreme Court unanimously invalidated three appointments to the NLRB because 
they did not meet the requirements of the Recess Appointments Clause.  However, the Court 
divided by a vote of 5-4 on what types of recess appointments are permissible. The majority held 
in its controlling opinion that recess appointments can be made during any recess of at least ten 
days, regardless of whether the recess is an intersession recess or an intrasession recess and 
regardless of when the vacancies being filled arose.  
Generally, after the Noel Canning decision was issued, the Board issued an order in many 
of the pending cases setting aside the vacated Decision and Order, and retaining the case on its 
docket for further action as appropriate. The Board has subsequently been addressing these cases 
on an individual basis. In many of the cases, the Board has issued decisions largely concordant 
with the prior Board rulings in the cases, adopting the reasoning of the vacated decisions, with 
short summaries of the rationale in the original board decision.  
For example in Grand Canyon Education, Inc. d/b/a Grand Canyon University, 28-CA-
022938, et al.; 362 NLRB No. 13 (February 2, 2015), the Board explained: 
  
In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Noel Canning, 
supra, we have considered de novo the judge’s decision and the record in light of 
the exceptions and briefs.  We have also considered the now-vacated Decision and  
Order, and we agree with the rationale  set forth  therein.  Accordingly, we  affirm  
the  judge’s  rulings,  findings,  and  conclusions  and  adopt  the  judge’s 
recommended  Order  to  the  extent  and  for  the  reasons stated  in  the  Decision  
and Order  reported  at  359 NLRB No. 164, which is incorporated herein by 
reference. 
 
In addressing a specific finding, the Board highlighted the issue and adopted the reasoning 
of the prior decision.  “We agree with the analysis in the vacated Decision and Order  regarding  
Human  Resources  Business  Partner Rhonda  Pigati’s  questioning  of  employee  Gloria  Johnson,  
and  we  find  that  it  violated  Section  8(a)(1)  of  the Act for  the  reasons  stated  therein.”   
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2. Religiously Affiliated Institutions 
 
Pacific Lutheran University, 361 NLRB No. 157 (2014)(With Regional Director 
decisions.) 
In Pacific Lutheran University, the Board modified the standards used to determine two 
important issues affecting the ability of faculty members at private-sector higher education 
institutions to unionize under the National Labor Relations Act: first, whether certain institutions 
and their faculty members are exempted from coverage of the Act due to their religious activities; 
and second, whether certain faculty members are managers, who are excluded from protection of 
the Act. See infra.  
The question of whether faculty members in religious institutions are subject to jurisdiction 
and coverage of the Act has long been a significant issue, with the Supreme Court’s 1979 decision 
in Catholic Bishops serving as the foundation for any analysis.  In Pacific Lutheran University, 
the Board established a two-part test for determining jurisdiction.  First, whether “as a threshold 
matter, [the university] holds itself out as providing a religious educational environment”; and if 
so, then, second, whether “it holds out the petitioned-for faculty members as performing a specific 
role in creating or maintaining the school’s religious educational environment.” 
The employer and its supporters argued that only the threshold question of whether the 
university was a bona fide religious institution was relevant, in which case the Act would not apply 
to any faculty members. The Board responded that this argument “overreaches because it focuses 
solely on the nature of the institution, without considering whether the petitioned-for faculty 
members act in support of the school’s religious mission.” Therefore, the Board established a 
standard that examines whether faculty members play a role in supporting the school’s religious 
environment.  
In so doing, the Board recognized concerns that inquiry into faculty members’ individual 
duties in religious institutions may involve examining the institution’s religious beliefs, which 
could intrude on the institution’s First Amendment rights. To avoid this issue the new standard 
focuses on what the institution “holds out” with respect to faculty members.  The Board explained, 
“We shall decline jurisdiction if the university ‘holds out’ its faculty members, in communications 
to current or potential students and faculty members, and the community at large, as performing a 
specific role in creating or maintaining the university’s religious purpose or mission.”  
The Board also found that that faculty must be “held out as performing a specific religious 
function,” such as integrating the institution’s religious teachings into coursework or engaging in 
religious indoctrination (emphasis in original). This would not be satisfied by general statements 
that faculty are to support religious goals, or that they must adhere to an institution’s commitment 
to diversity or academic freedom.  
Applying this standard, the Board found that while Pacific Lutheran University held itself 
out as providing a religious educational environment, the petitioned-for faculty members were not 
performing a specific religious function. Therefore, the Board asserted jurisdiction and turned to 
the question of whether certain of the faculty members were managerial employees.  
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Following the issuance of the Pacific Lutheran University decision, Regional Directors 
issued decisions finding that university faculty were not exempt from Board jurisdiction in Loyola 
University Chicago (13-RC-164618), Chicago IL (Reg. 13, December 29, 2015), Loyola 
University Chicago (II) (13-RC-168082), Chicago IL (Reg. 13, March 4, 2016), Manhattan 
College (02-RC-023543) New York, NY (Reg. 2 August 26, 2015), Saint Xavier University  (13-
RC-022025) Chicago, IL, (Reg. 13, June 1, 2015), Duquesne University of the Holy Spirit (06-RC-
080933)  Pittsburgh, PA, (Reg. 6 June 5, 2015), Seattle University (19-RC-122863) Seattle, WA, 
(Reg. 19, August 17, 2015) and finding that a Catholic college was exempt from Board jurisdiction 
in Carroll College, (19-RC-165133) Helena MT (Reg. 19, January 19, 2016) teachers at an Islamic 
Academy were exempt from Board jurisdiction in Islamic Saudi Academy  (05-RC-080474) 
Alexandria, VA (Reg. 5 Sept. 1, 2015). 
 
B. Faculty, Graduate Assistants and Players Coverage as Employees Entitled to 
Collective Bargaining Representation 
 
1. Faculty as Managers   
 
Pacific Lutheran University, 361 NLRB No. 157 (2014)(With Regional Director 
decisions.) 
In Pacific Lutheran University, the Board also modified the standards used to determine 
whether certain faculty members are managers, who are excluded from protection of the Act. This 
question arises from the Supreme Court’s decision in Yeshiva, where the Court found that in certain 
circumstances faculty may be considered “managers” who are excluded from the protections of 
the Act.  The Board noted that the application of Yeshiva previously involved an open-ended and 
uncertain set of criteria for making decisions regarding whether faculty were managers. This led 
to significant complications in determining whether the test was met and created uncertainty for 
all of the parties.  
Further, in explaining the need for the new standard, the Board specifically highlighted, as 
AAUP had in its amicus brief, the increasing corporatization of the university. The Board stated, 
“Indeed our experience applying Yeshiva has generally shown that colleges and universities are 
increasingly run by administrators, which has the effect of concentrating and centering authority 
away from the faculty in a way that was contemplated in Yeshiva, but found not to exist at Yeshiva 
University itself. Such considerations are relevant to our assessment of whether the faculty 
constitute managerial employees.”  
In Pacific Lutheran University, the Board sought to create a simpler framework for 
determining whether faculty members served as managers. The Board explained that under the 
new standard, “where a party asserts that university faculty are managerial employees, we will 
examine the faculty’s participation in the following areas of decision making: academic programs, 
enrollment management, finances, academic policy, and personnel policies and decisions.” The 
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Board will give greater weight to the first three areas, as these are “areas of policy making that 
affect the university as whole.”  The Board “will then determine, in the context of the university’s 
decision making structure and the nature of the faculty’s employment relationship with the 
university, whether the faculty actually control or make effective recommendation over those 
areas. If they do, we will find that they are managerial employees and, therefore, excluded from 
the Act’s protections.” 
The Board emphasized that to be found managers, faculty must in fact have actual control 
or make effective recommendations over policy areas. This requires that “the party asserting 
managerial status must prove actual—rather than mere paper—authority. . . .  A faculty handbook 
may state that the faculty has authority over or responsibility for a particular decision-making area, 
but it must be demonstrated that the faculty exercises such authority in fact.” Proof requires 
“specific evidence or testimony regarding the nature and number of faculty decisions or 
recommendations in a particular decision making area, and the subsequent review of those 
decisions or recommendations, if any, by the university administration prior to implementation, 
rather than mere conclusory assertions that decisions or recommendations are generally followed.”  
Further, the Board used strong language in defining “effective” as meaning that “recommendations 
must almost always be followed by the administration” or “routinely become operative without 
independent review by the administration. 
Following the issuance of the Pacific Lutheran University decision, the Board remanded a 
number of cases involving whether faculty members are managers under Yeshiva. In these cases, 
the Board generally explained:  
 
On December 16, 2014, the Board issued its decision in Pacific Lutheran 
University, 361 NLRB No. 157 (2014), which specifically addressed the standard 
the Board will apply for determining, in accordance with NLRB v. Yeshiva 
University, 444 U.S. 672 (1980), when faculty members are managerial employees, 
whose rights to engage in collective bargaining are not protected by the Act.  
 
Accordingly, the Board remands this proceeding to the Regional Director for 
further appropriate action consistent with Pacific Lutheran University, including 
reopening the record, if necessary.  . . . [Note 2] Members Miscimarra and Johnson 
adhere to their separate opinions in Pacific Lutheran University.  Nevertheless, they 
agree with their colleagues that a remand is appropriate. 
 
Point Park University, Case No. 06-RC-01226 (February 25, 2015). See also Seattle University, 
Case No. 19-RC-122863 (February 3, 2015).  
Applying Pacific Lutheran, Regional Directors issued decisions finding that faculty were 
not managers under Yeshiva in University of Southern California, (31-RC-164864 and 31-RC-
164868) Los Angeles CA (Reg. 31 Dec. 24, 2015), Seattle University (19-RC-122863) Seattle, 
WA, (Reg. 19, August 17, 2015) and were managers in Carroll College, (19-RC-165133), Helena 
29
Nisenson: Annual Legal Update (2016)
Published by The Keep, 2016
 26 
MT (Reg. 19, January 19, 2016). In Point Park, the employer dropped their objections based on 
Yeshiva, and agreed to an election, which the union won.  
2. Graduate Assistants Right to Organize 
 
Northwestern University and College Athletes Players Association (CAPA), NLRB Case 
No. 13-RC-121359 (Aug. 17, 2015) 
In a highly publicized case in which the AAUP filed an amicus brief, the National Labor 
Relations Board declined to assert jurisdiction over the Northwestern University football players’ 
petition seeking union representation rendering the players unable to unionize under the auspices 
of the NLRB. The Board, however, explicitly limited its decision to the unusual circumstances of 
the case, avoiding broader questions involving the unionization of graduate student assistants and 
others. The Board concluded that asserting jurisdiction over the Northwestern University 
scholarship football players would not promote stability in labor relations due to the unusual facts 
of the case, which involved unionizing a single football team rather than teams on a league wide 
basis, and the fact that the NCAA and the Big Ten conference maintain substantial control over 
individual teams, the overwhelming majority of which are from public colleges and universities 
over which the Board cannot assert jurisdiction. The Board emphasized that “this case involves 
novel and unique circumstances,” repeatedly highlighting the narrow and limited nature of the 
decision.  
While the Northwestern case was pending, the issue of graduate student assistant 
unionization under the NLRA was proceeding in other cases.  
 
Columbia University, NLRB Case No. 02-RC-143012, review granted (Dec. 23, 2015)  
This case appears to be one in which the Board will reconsider its holding in Brown 
University, 342 NLRB 483 (2004) that graduate students were not "employees" for purpose of 
Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). In particular the NLRB issued an 
invitation to file amicus briefs addressing whether the Board should modify or overrule its 2004 
decision in Brown University, which had found that graduate assistants were not employees and 
therefore did not have statutory rights to unionize.  342 NLRB 483 (2004).  
The case arose when the United Autoworkers sought to organize student employees who 
provide instructional services, including graduate assistants, at Columbia University. In opposing 
the efforts to unionize, the University argued that graduate assistants are not “employees” under 
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and therefore do not have statutory rights to choose 
whether to be represented by a union.  In doing so the University relied on a 2004 decision by the 
Board in Brown University, 342 NLRB 483, which held that graduate student assistants who 
perform services at a university in connection with their studies are not statutory employees under 
the NLRA.  
The NLRB Regional Director initially dismissed the election petition, without a factual 
hearing, finding that it sought an election among graduate students who are not employees pursuant 
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to the Board's decision in Brown. The union appealed and the Board remanded the case for hearing 
so that evidence could be presented that would allow the Board to reconsider the Brown decision. 
A twelve-day hearing was held before an NLRB hearing officer in New York City. The Regional 
Director issued a decision on October 30, 2015, which included lengthy factual findings regarding 
the duties and compensation of graduate assistants at Columbia University. Nonetheless, the 
Regional Director dismissed the election petition, stating “I conclude that I am constrained by 
Brown, which holds that graduate assistants are not ‘employees’ within the meaning of Section 
2(3) of the Act. Because the Petitioner seeks to represent individuals employed in classifications 
which fall within the term, ‘graduate assistants,’ Brown is controlling.” 
The Union appealed to the National Labor Relations Board, and on December 23, 2015, 
the Board granted the request for review.  On January 13, 2016, the Board issued a Notice and 
Invitation to File Briefs inviting amici parties to address one or more of four questions. Two of the 
questions directly addressed the Brown decision: “1) Should the Board modify or overrule Brown 
University, 342 NLRB 483 (2004), which held that graduate student assistants who perform 
services at a university in connection with their studies are not statutory employees within the 
meaning of Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act? 2) If the Board modifies or overrules 
Brown University, supra, what should be the standard for determining whether graduate student 
assistants engaged in research are statutory employees, including graduate student assistants 
engaged in research funded by external grants? See New York University, 332 NLRB 1205, 1209 
fn. 10 (2000) (relying on Leland Stanford Junior University, 214 NLRB 621 (1974)).” 
The AAUP filed an amicus brief with the National Labor Relations Board arguing that 
graduate assistants at private sector institutions should be considered employees with collective 
bargaining rights in keeping with its long history of support for the unionization of graduate 
assistants. The AAUP has previously filed numerous amicus briefs arguing the graduate assistants 
are employees with rights to unionize under the NLRA, has issued statements affirming the rights 
of graduate assistants to unionize, and has an active committee on graduate students and 
professional employees that represents the interests of graduate students.   
The AAUP brief in this case addressed the two questions involving the Brown decision. 
The brief argued that graduate assistants, including those working on federal grant funded research, 
are employees with the right to unionize under the NLRA and it refuted the Brown decision’s 
speculative claims that collective bargaining would compromise academic freedom and the 
cooperative relationships between faculty mentors and their graduate student mentees. 
The brief cited three reasons why graduate student assistants perform work in return for 
compensation and are thus employees under the Act. First, when graduate students work as 
teaching and research assistants, their work is indistinguishable from that performed by university 
faculty.  Second, graduate students teach because they are paid, not because it is at the core of  
graduate education. Third, universities generally treat any stipend as payment for teaching or 
supporting the professor’s research, not as general financial support to enable the graduate student 
to attend class or conduct his or her own dissertation research. 
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In rebutting the argument that unionization would threaten academic freedom, the brief 
pointed out that unions, through collective bargaining agreements, often promote the cause of 
academic freedom.  
 
Local AAUP chapters have successfully established explicit guarantees of academic 
freedom in their collective bargaining contracts. Some chapters of unionized faculty refer 
to the AAUP’s 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure and quote 
it extensively in their collective bargaining contracts. Other faculty collective bargaining 
agreements to which an AAUP chapter is a party incorporate the language of the 1940 
Statement to define academic freedom. These contracts make promises of academic 
freedom legally enforceable. 
 
In refuting the speculative claim that collective bargaining would compromise the 
cooperative relationships between faculty mentors and their graduate student mentees, the AAUP 
brief cited real life examples and large empirical studies of unionized campuses. The brief 
highlighted a recent study that is particularly compelling. 
 
[A] 2013 study comparing student-faculty relationships, academic freedom, and economic 
well-being across unionized and non-unionized campuses confirmed the findings of prior 
surveys: unionization does not interfere with faculty-student relationships or harm the 
education or training of graduate students. See Sean E. Rodgers, Adrienne E. Eaton, & 
Paula B. Voos, Effects of Unionization on Graduate Student Employees: Student Relations, 
Academic Freedom, and Pay, 66 ILR Review 487-501 (2013).  . . .   Comparing unionized 
and non-unionized graduate student employees in terms of faculty-student relations, 
academic freedom, and pay, the study found that union represented graduate student 
employees reported higher levels of personal and professional support and unionized 
graduate student employees fared better on pay. 
 
Therefore, AAUP brief concluded that “the Board should overrule the test of employee status 
applied in Brown University and return to its well-reasoned NYU decision, which found 
collective bargaining by graduate assistants compatible with academic freedom.”  
The New School, NLRB Case No. 02-RC-143009, review granted (Oct. 21, 2015)     
This case involved a petition for election by graduate students aimed at having the Board 
reconsider and reverse its holding in Brown University, 342 NLRB 483 (2004) that graduate 
students were not "employees" for purpose of Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA).  Initially, the Region 2 Director rejected the petition, without a hearing or argument, 
based on the Board’s decision in Brown. The Union appealed, and on March 13, 2015 the Board 
concluded that the cases raised substantial issues under the NLRA, and cases should not have been 
decided without a hearing. In so doing, the Board allowed the parties to provide evidence and 
argument regarding whether the Brown case should be reconsidered or reversed. After conducting 
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a hearing following the remand, the Regional Director dismissed the petition a second time. She 
concluded, based on the factual record, that the Petitioner seeks an election among graduate 
students who are not “employees” within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act under Brown 
University, and that the facts did not warrant finding the instant case distinguishable from Brown 
University. The Union appealed. 
On July 30, 2015, based on seven days of hearing, the Regional Director issued a decision 
in The New School case, including extensive discussion of the evidence. While the facts were 
generally favorable for the unionization of graduate student assistants, the Regional Director 
concluded that she was bound by the Board’s decision in Brown until the Board reconsiders or 
overrules that decision. Accordingly, the Regional Director stated, “I conclude that I am 
constrained by Brown, which holds that graduate assistants are not ‘employees.’. . . Because the 
Petitioner seeks to represent individuals employed in classifications which fall within the term 
‘graduate assistants,’ Brown is controlling, and therefore I am dismissing the petition.” On August 
13, 2015, the union appealed the Regional Director’s decision, requesting that the Board overrule 
Brown University and hold that graduate student assistants are employees with rights to unionize 
under the NLRA. On October 21, 2015, the Board voted 3 to 1 to grant a request to review the 
decision.  
 
C. Employee Rights to Use Email 
 
Purple Communications, 361 NLRB No. 126 (Dec. 11, 2014) 
The National Labor Relations Board recently issued a decision significantly expanding the 
right of employees to use their employers' e-mail systems for union organizing and other activities 
protected by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act.  
In Purple Communications the board explained that “the use of email as a common form 
of workplace communication has expanded dramatically in recent years.”  Therefore the board 
ruled that “employee use of email for statutorily protected communications on nonworking time 
must presumptively be permitted by employers who have chosen to give employees access to their 
email systems.” While the case addressed communications supporting the union during an 
organizing drive, given the board's expansion of protected activity, this also includes 
communications critical of the employer's employment-related policies, practices and management 
decisions. 
Therefore, employees who are given access to their employer’s e-mail system for business 
purposes now will be able to use that system on non-working time to engage in a wide range of 
protected communications, including union support and comments critical of the employer's 
employment-related policies and management decisions.  While the board did not directly address 
other types of electronic equipment and communications, such as instant messaging or texting 
from employer-owned smartphones and other devices, the board noted that a similar analysis 
would potentially apply. 
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However, there are limitations to the decision. First, since the decision was issued by the 
NLRB, under the statute protecting private-sector employees, it only applies to private-sector 
employees. Second, the board only addressed employee use of work e-mail, and did not extend the 
protection to cover use by non-employees. Third, the protected use was limited to non-work time, 
and absent discrimination against the union it does not give the employees right to use the work e-
mail during work time. Fourth, the employer may in certain limited circumstances prohibit or limit 
the use of work e-mail on non-work time. Finally, this ruling will likely be appealed and could be 
overturned by the courts. 
Nonetheless, this is a major step forward for the rights of faculty members in private 
institutions. E-mail is one of the primary ways in which faculty speak to each other in the modern 
world. The ability to use email to communicate is essential to faculty, particularly contingent 
faculty, who are often dispersed and may not be able to speak directly to each other regularly. This 
decision recognizes this reality and provides private-sector faculty members’ use of work email to 
communicate with each other about union matters will be protected. 
 
D. Bargaining Units 
 
Lesley University, NLRB Case No. 01-RC-148228 (NLRB Reg. Dir. April 8, 2015) 
On April 8, 2015, NLRB Regional Director Jonathan B. Kreisberg issued a decision and 
direction of election concerning a representation petition filed by SEIU that seeks to represent a 
unit of approximately 181 full-time and regular part-time core faculty employed by Lesley 
University including faculty with titles of Instructor, Assistant Professor, Associate Professor, 
Professor, and University Professor.  In its petition, SEIU seeks to also represent in the proposed 
unit approximately 14 faculty employed in the same titles but under temporary contracts. 
In his decision, Regional Director Kriesberg rejected the objection by Lesley University to 
the inclusion of the temporary faculty in the proposed unit finding that the temporary faculty had 
a community of interest with the core faculty because they perform many of the same duties 
including teaching, curriculum development, advising students, participating in departmental 
meetings and serving on faculty committees.  In addition, the two faculty groups was found to 
enjoy many of the same terms and conditions of employment.  While temporary faculty serve 
under contracts for a one-year term, Regional Director Kreisberg concluded that they had a 
reasonable expectation of continued employment noting that 35 per cent of temporary faculty have 
served for a least two consecutive years notwithstanding their one-year temporary appointments.   
 
E. NLRB Elections 
 
NLRB Election Rules, 29 CFR Parts 101, 102, and 103; Guidance Memorandum on 
Representation Case Procedure Changes Effective April 14_ 2015, NLRB GC 15_06, 
(NLRB General Counsel April 6, 2015). 
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In December 2015 the NLRB issued revisions to union election rules that should vastly 
simplify and expedite the election process.  Previously, the results of elections could be tied up for 
years in pointless litigation, delaying the results of a democratic process, a situation that would be 
intolerable in any other context. Specifically, the rule includes the following: Provides for 
electronic filing and transmission of election petitions and other documents; Ensures that 
employees, employers and unions receive timely information they need to understand and 
participate in the representation case process; Eliminates or reduces unnecessary litigation, 
duplication and delay; Adopts best practices and uniform procedures across regions; Requires that 
additional contact information (personal telephone numbers and email addresses) be included in 
voter lists, to the extent that information is available to the employer, in order to enhance 
information sharing by permitting other parties to the election to communicate with voters about 
the election; and Allows parties to consolidate all election-related appeals to the Board into a single 
appeals process. Cumulatively, these changes will likely reduce the time from the filing of a 
representation petition to the holding of an election to between 10 and 20 days. 
Some of the new provisions are particularly important for faculty members. For example, 
the new election rules also require that employers provide the union with personal email addresses 
and phone numbers for employees. This is particularly important for reaching out to contingent 
faculty, who often perform most of their work off campus.  Also, unions must be aware that the 
NLRB representation hearing and election process is extremely fast paced and the NLRB will 
rarely grant requests for extensions of time. Therefore, unions should be fully aware of the revised 
rules and prepared for the hearing and election process prior to filing any election petition with the 
NLRB.  
 
VIII. Collective Bargaining Cases and Issues – Public Sector 
 
A. Bargaining Units 
 
State of New Jersey v. Council of New Jersey State College Locals, AFT, 2015 N.J. 
Super. Unpub. LEXIS 322 (Superior. Ct., Appellate Div. 2015) 
An intermediate New Jersey appellate court has overturned a decision by the New Jersey 
Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) dismissing representation petitions for the 
unionization of approximately 600 managers at nine New Jersey state colleges and universities.  
The court concluded that PERC acted arbitrarily by dismissing the representation cases without 
conducting an investigatory hearing to gather evidence to determine whether the employees in the 
at-issue positions perform duties and functions that would make them subject to the statutory 
exclusion of "managerial executives."  Unless the court decision is reversed, the cases will return 
to PERC for a hearing to determine the managerial status of each position. Notably, the New Jersey 
public sector collective bargaining law, unlike the NLRA includes a specific definition concerning 
the managerial exemption to the right to unionize for purposes of collective bargaining. 
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B. Arbitration 
 
Univ. Sys. Of New Hampshire v. Dorfsman, 2015 N.H. LEXIS 132 (N.H. Dec. 23, 2015)  
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire upheld a lower court’s decision to vacate an 
arbitrator’s decision that UNH had violated its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the 
Union by terminating a Professor’s employment for engaging in an act of "moral turpitude." In 
2012, Marco Dorfsman, an Associate Professor and Department Chair intentionally lowered the 
evaluations that students had given a certain lecturer.  UNH terminated Dorfsman's employment 
for this conduct, which UNH determined constituted an act of "moral turpitude" within the 
meaning of the CBA. Dorfsman and the Union grieved his termination, and, pursuant to the CBA, 
the parties submitted to binding arbitration. The arbitrator agreed with UNH that Dorfsman's 
conduct constituted an act of "moral turpitude" (a finding that was not contested by either party on 
appeal.). The arbitrator determined that, because of several mitigating factors, Dorfsman's 
termination did not comport with principles of just cause. At the arbitration hearing, the arbitrator 
remanded the matter so that the parties could negotiate the proper level of discipline; should they 
fail to agree within 30 days, the arbitrator would determine Dorfsman's discipline. UNH filed a 
complaint in superior court arguing that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority. The court agreed 
with UNH and vacated the arbitration award, and the case was appealed to the Supreme Court.   
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of UNH on several procedural issues, it then addressed 
whether the arbitrator had exceeded his authority.  The Court highlighted that the parties CBA had 
a specific provision governing discipline for “moral turpitude” which stated "If charges involving 
moral turpitude are sustained, the bargaining unit member may be terminated immediately and the 
bargaining unit member shall not be entitled to receive further pay or benefits." Id. at 13. The Court 
held that having found that UNH disciplined Dorfsman for “moral turpitude,” the arbitrator 
“erroneously applied a further just cause analysis to misconduct that was enumerated in the CBA 
as a proper basis for discharge” and therefore exceeded the scope of his authority. 
 
 
C. Agency Fee and Exclusive Representation – See Section II, D and E.  
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